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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades or so, researchers have been investigating the determinants and consequences of earnings quality (see Dechow, Ge and Schrand, 2010) . However, a central issue that has received very limited attention is the role of business strategy 1 in determining earnings quality. To the extent that investment decisions and accounting choices are jointly made (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990 ), earnings quality is potentially a function of business strategy because investment decisions flow from business strategy. Using the Miles and Snow (1978) strategy typology and an objective strategy-proxy based on Snow and Hrebiniak (1980) , we document that defender-strategy firms are associated with higher levels of earnings management and prospector-strategy firms are associated with higher levels of accounting conservatism. We further examine the role of wider economic environments on the relation between business strategy and earnings quality. Financial reporting behavior of prospector-strategy firms and defender-strategy firms during high and low economic growth periods appears to be quite opposite. We find that during high (low) economic growth periods, prospector firms exhibit less (more) accounting conservatism whereas defender firms exhibit lesser (more) earnings management.
Our primary measure of accounting conservatism is the Givoly and Hayn's (2000) measure of non-operating negative accruals measure. We define conservatism as "a function of the firm's cumulative accounting policies which arise from both discretionary and mandatory policy decisions where, within each, there nevertheless are degrees of discretion" (Artiach and Clarkson, 2011, p. 4) . Our primary measure of earnings management is the absolute discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones model .
We analyzed two samples of U.S. listed companies over the period [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . In particular, we analyzed 23,390 firm-years for testing the association between earnings management and business strategy, and 14,729 firm-years for testing the relation between accounting conservatism and business strategy. We argue that, to date, associations present between business strategy, investor expectations and financial reporting have been largely ignored by researchers, resulting in an unexplained bias present within the financial accounting decision making process. This unknown bias has resulted in investors receiving an incomplete picture of firm performance as well as inaccurate information regarding the success of the implemented firm strategies. As such, without research to provide awareness of the plausible association between business strategy and earnings quality, investors will continue to be misled (through firm financial statements).
Therefore this paper serves to inform investors, accountants, managers, auditors and regulators on the association between business strategies and earnings quality, allowing these stakeholders to fully understand the true nature of firm performance. We propose that, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC), this literature is particularly relevant in that it can contribute to a wave of new research-led regulation that seeks to limit the systemic effects of corporate collapse through better communication between investors and firm managers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss business strategy in general and develop hypotheses by exploring the link between business strategy and financial reporting quality. Section III proposes the research methodology. Section IV discusses the sample selection produce and provides descriptive statistics. In Section V, we discuss our test rests. Section VI reports various sensitivity tests. In Section VII, we offer some conclusions.
II. BUSINESS STRATEGY AND FINANCIAL REPORTING Business Strategy
The concept of strategy was introduced in organizational literature and advanced profoundly during the 1950s by researchers at the Harvard Business School (Snow and Hambrick, 1980) .
Chandler defines strategy as "the determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of the enterprise and the adoption of resources necessary for carrying out these goals" (1962, p. 13) . Mintzberg (1987) argues that an organizational strategy alludes to a firm's plans, patterns, positions and perspectives. We view business strategy as a consistent set of decisions that defines how a firm competes within a given product market. Although there are diverse views on what exactly constitutes a strategy, researchers agree on distinguishing between strategy formulation and strategy implementation as two distinct phases of a strategy (Snow and Hambrick, 1980) . This distinction is important because it allows researchers to observe and measure strategy based on firm-level quantitative data. As such, we interpret what realized strategy was implemented within the firm (in hindsight) irrespective of the strategy formulation process.
In this study, we concentrate on strategy implementation and measure business-level strategy via objective indicators as proposed by Snow and Hambrick (1980) . Snow and Hrebiniak (1980) note that "the typology of Miles and Snow (1978) is the only one that characterizes an organization as a complete system, especially its strategic orientation" (p.
318). The Miles and Snow (1978) typology classifies firms into prospectors, defenders, analyzers, and reactors, depending on the firm's market orientation. Miles and Snow (1978) also note that prospector and defender strategies are the most dominant types. Snow and Hambrick (1980) examine the different methods for the categorization of firm strategy within this typology and propose (amongst other categorization options) the examination of strategy using 'objective indicators' based on the collection of financial data of sample firms.
Employing 'objective indicators' for measuring business-level strategy has other merits. First, unlike other approaches, this approach controls for perceptual, and to a lesser extent, interpretive bias (Snow and Hambrick, 1980) . Second, this approach is relatively wellsuited for identifying implemented or realized strategies (Snow and Hambrick, 1980) . Third, this approach is commonly used by strategy researchers (e.g., Miller and Friesen, 1978; Venkatraman and Grant, 1986 ).
We build on Snow and Hambrick's (1980) proposal by using objective data to classify firms based on how well they fit into the two strategy orientations: prospectors and defenders. Miles and Snow (1978), and Hambrick (1983) note that prospector firms will have a stronger commitment to product development and innovation, and frequently alter their products and markets. These firms thrive in business environments that are somewhat unpredictable and succeed by examining the market constantly for new opportunities. Further, these firms often encourage innovation over efficiency. In contrast, defender firms stress efficiency of operations and low levels of product development or a strong defense of their existing marketplaces (Miles and Snow, 1978) . Hambrick (1983) describes defenders as firms which tend to compete mainly on price, delivery, or quality; defenders make large investments in process engineering; they have mechanistic structures, and they are run primarily under the influence of production and accounting executives. Defender firms promote efficiency over innovation and they often build cost efficiency through vertical integration. These firms thrive in environments that change slowly. Readers are referred to Miles, Snow, Meyer and Coleman (1978) for a fuller treatment on all the four strategy types.
Business-level Strategy and Accounting
We invoke three theories to delineate the connection between business-level strategy and the accounting decision making process. These theories are agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , political cost theory (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978) and transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937) . Jensen & Meckling (1976) provide a sound starting point in analyzing accounting decision maker's behavior. They hold that the agents of a firm will always make decisions to maximize self-interest and will only make decisions in the firm's best interest where their personal interests and those of the firm do not diverge (the problem of managerial agency).
Hence, managers will act in one of the two ways during the accounting decision making process: when their interests are aligned with those of the owners of the firm, managers will make such decisions that promote the firm's interests in order to further managers' own interests (efficient contracting); when their interests are not aligned with those of the owners, managers will make decisions to maximize their self-interest (managerial opportunism).
During accounting decision making process, the value of having an 'objective' and 'impartial' set of financial statements will likely be considered and weighed against the benefits associated with a biased accounting choice that affects earnings quality. Both the political cost theory (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978) and the transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937) explain why firms will have incentives for adopting a biased approach to financial reporting.
In proposing the political cost theory, Watts & Zimmerman (1978) argue that in making management decisions (including accounting decisions) managers must consider the wider regulatory environment. They further argue that accounting is a form of communication that is disseminated (in the case of publicly listed companies) to regulatory decision-makers and the wider public (alongside with investors). This dissemination illuminates the public's understandings of individual firms and as such influences the decision-making of regulatory bodies. Watts & Zimmerman (1978) note that when the picture in the wider public's mind is one of a large growing firm, the public and their representatives (regulators) will associate this with excess and greed and will seek to mitigate the profits achieved by these firms through taxes, antitrust suits, product regulation, reduction or loss of awarded government contracts and industry regulation; all of which result in a reduction in the earnings capacity and wealth of the firm.
Understanding this, managers who believe that their organization has achieved or may achieve a reputation of greed and excess (large and highly profitable) may attempt to manipulate the public and regulatory perception of their firm. This manipulation can be achieved through the use of public relations staff, community work or through increased accounting conservatism (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978) . Watts and Zimmerman (1978) further argue that increased accounting conservatism acts to improve the reputation of the firm by reforming the firm's image, from a greedy firm to a leaner organization.
Firm managers who are not concerned with looking highly profitable or overly wealthy are likely to focus on accounting policies that maximize investor confidence in the firm. These accounting policies include strategies of impartial accounting decision making or strategies that maximize reported earnings. Coase (1937) defined the boundaries of the firm. Coase (1937) argued that the existence of the firm must be the reduction of transaction costs that would otherwise be associated with market transactions. A natural implication of this is that firms will be judged by potential investors, at least in part, on the basis of how efficient they are in lowering transaction costs.
Firms expanding within existing markets and new markets (prospectors in nature) are likely to attract costs associated with such expansion (with the hope of achieving costs savings or increased revenue at a future date) and as such are unlikely to be able to be compared and evaluated against other firms within the market place. In contrast, firms which are identified by investors as market defenders (with little interest in expansion) will be seen and evaluated by investors based on the transaction costs that they consistently incur in proportion to earnings.
As such when engaging in accounting decision making, firms that are market defenders will be incentivized to smooth earnings to maintain a continued level of transaction costs while the managers of prospector's firms will place little emphasis on reducing transaction costs and instead will conserve potential earnings for future accounting periods where they can be more useful to the firm and its managers.
Owners of firms which adopt defender strategies are likely to place a higher expectation of immediate financial performance and smoothness of earnings on these firms, because defender firms are likely to be seen by investors as inherently more stable and less risky investments to hold. These investor expectations therefore will lead to higher performance requirements for the management of defender firms incentivizing the firm's management to make accounting choices that help in meeting investors' expectation of firm 
Impact of Wider Economic Environments
In forming strategies, firms always need to consider the wider market, industry, economic and regulatory environments. Because changes in the external environments of a firm are likely to change the supply and demand forces in the product market in which a firm is competing. Hence, realized strategy of firms will, in part, be dependent on ongoing and changing emerging strategy where firms seek to respond to changes in the firm's external environment (Mintzberg, 1987) . This point is supported by the resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) , which holds that firms will be shaped by environmental and external influences and will alter firm strategy in response to economic (and regulatory) events.
This change in firm strategy in response to external environments is likely to filter down to firm accounting decision making processes. Archambault and Archambault (2003) and La Porta et al. (2000) note that firm's accounting tactics will often be dependent on the location of the firm (geographical and regulatory). Further, changes in a firm's external environment influence existing relations between firm characteristics and accounting decision making (Ball et al., 2000; Leuz et al., 2003) . In sum, the effects of the macro-economic environment (as part of the external environment) are likely to alter the magnitude and structure of benefits and costs inherent in the accounting decision making processes, and thereby, change the relations between accounting policy choices and firm strategy. Thus, we hypothesize that:
The wider economic environment alters the relation between business-level strategy and earnings quality.
Because changes in economic environment are unpredictable and can affect a firm either favorably or unfavorably, we are unable to make a signed prediction.
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
First, we examine the level of accounting conservatism present within the annual financial statements. Our proxy for accounting conservatism is based on Givoly and Hayn's (2000) measure of negative accruals. They argue that conservative accounting results in persistently negative accruals, and more negative accruals reflect more conservative accounting. Without management intervention, accruals are expected to reverse over time. Hence, persistent cumulative negative accruals represent a conservatism bias with the firm's accounting system rather than the transitory nature of accruals (Artiach and Clarkson, 2011) . We focus on nonoperating accruals because operating accruals likely reflect firm economic characteristics unrelated to conservatism (Givoly and Hayn, 2000) . To capture the persistence in accumulated accruals over a sufficiently long period, we use a six-year window, consistent with Ahmed et al. (2002) , Artiach and Clarkson (2011), and Francis et al. (2004) . Thus, our accounting conservatism measure is:
Where, NOPAC it is non-operating accruals and TA it is total assets, both for firm i at fiscal year-end t. Similar to Artiach and Clarkson (2011) , we multiply the average accruals by -1 to produce a measure that is increasing in conservatism. We use this proxy to investigate any possible relation between strategy and accounting conservatism as stated in H 1 . Specifically, we employ the following econometric model: Where:
STRT it = the business strategy of firm i in year t. Adopting the Snow and Hambrick (1980) typology, we create a composite strategy score for each firm. The composite score is constructed using the ratio of research and development to sales, the ratio of research and development expense per employee (Hill and Snell 1988) , the ratio of employees to sales, and the Market to Book ratio. Composite scores range from 4 to 16 with firms under 10 considered to be defenders and firms scoring 10 or over considered to be prospectors 2 ; LN_ASSETS = natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t; F_LEV = the year-end total liabilities scaled by year-end total assets of firm i in year t; G_SALES = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in current year minus sales in prior year and divided by sales in prior year for firm i in year t; G_PPE = the growth rate of gross PPE, defined as the gross PPE in current year minus the gross PPE in prior year and divided by the gross PPE in prior year for firm i in year t; M_RISK = is a measure of systematic risk which shows the relationship between the volatility of the stock and the volatility of the market. This coefficient is based on between 23 and 35 consecutive month end price percent changes and their relativity to a local market index;
Industry controls
= dummy variables to capture industry differences in accounting conservatism; Year controls = dummy variables to capture year-to-year differences in accounting conservatism.
Then we examine the level of earnings management present within annual financial statements using the proxy ‫|‬DACCR it ‫|‬ which is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of firm i in year t under the Modified Jones model . We use this proxy to investigate any possible relation between strategy and earnings management as stated in H 2 .
We employ the following econometric model: (3) where: G_PPE = the growth rate of gross PPE, defined as the gross PPE in current year minus the gross PPE in prior year and divided by the gross PPE in prior year for firm i in year t; CFO = the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by total assets; LOSS = loss takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t reports negative income before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise.
All other variables are as defined before.
To test H 3 , we need a proxy for wider macro-economic environments. We argue that the real Gross Domestic Production (GDP) growth rates of a country capture the essence of the macro-economic environments of that country. Business firms regularly monitor and forecast industry and economic outlooks and accordingly make strategic and operating decisions suitable to a specific economic environment. For example, in periods of high ( We consider other years to be moderate-growth period. We are interested to test whether the relation between business strategy and earnings quality changes across high-and low-growth periods. Hence, we estimate the following models: (5) where: GDP_Dummy = a binary variable coded 1 for high U.S. real GDP growth years (1999, 2000 and 2004) and 0 for low U.S. GDP growth years (2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009 ); STRT*GDP_Dummy = the interaction term between STRT and GDP_Dummy to capture the effect of the wider macro-economic environments on the relation between business strategy and earnings quality.
All other variables are as defined before. Obviously, our variables of interest are STRT and STRT*GDP_Dummy. In particular, we are interested to know whether the sign of β3 (ά 3 ) differs from that of β1 (ά 1 ) in model (4) (model (5) and whether β 3 (ά 3 ) is statistically significant.
We estimate all our models using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression technique.
We estimate both pooled and annual samples to enhance credibility of our results.
IV. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We obtained data for U.S. listed companies from the World Scope database for the period 1999-2009. Because our sample period covers the years affected by the GFC, we are able to glean the effect of the GFC on the association between business strategy and earnings quality.
Initially, we identified 25,623 firm-years for the DACCR sample and 16,740 firm-years for the CON sample. For both samples we then go on to exclude financial institutions, funds and overseas companies (81 observations in each sample) in order to keep this study within the single regulatory environment of the U.S. and to avoid repeated counting of data that may take place where a listed company is an investment vehicle or a share fund. Then we exclude the top 0.5% and the bottom 0.5% observations for each variable as we considered these to be extreme observations (DACCR sample: 1,565 observations; CON sample: 1,465 observations). Finally, we exclude 587 (465) firm-years from the DACCR (CON) sample because these observations were larger than three times of the absolute value of studentized residuals. Thus, our final sample is 14,729 (23,390) firm-years for the CON (DACCR) analysis. The sample selection process is reported in Table 1 , Panel A.
[INSERT TABLE 1]
Panel B of Table 1 shows sample composition by year. As Panel B reveals, the firmyears are widely dispersed across the sample period. In terms of strategy type, both panels suggest that an increasing proportion of firms adopted the defender strategy during the GFC. V. RESULTS Table 4 presents the results of estimating model (2) on the pooled as well as annual samples.
[INSERT TABLE 2]

Accounting Conservatism
As reported in Table 4 , the coefficient of STRT is statistically significant across all estimates at the 5% or better levels (two- Because we multiplied our proxy for conservatism by -1 to produce an increasing measure of conservatism, the consistently positive coefficient on STRT provides evidence supporting H 1.
That is, prospector firms are more likely to adopt accounting conservatism than defender firms. Results in Table 4 further suggest that while larger firms and firms with greater systematic risk are less likely to adopt conservatism in reporting, more leveraged firms and growing firms are more likely to adopt accounting conservatism. Thus, while debt levels may play a monitoring role against aggressive financial reporting, incentives for aggressive earnings management decline in growing firms (through growth in sales) allowing these firms to adopt more conservative accounting policies. Further, firms with greater systematic risk cannot afford to adopt conservatism plausibly to maintain earnings performance. Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that firms which have a higher composite score for strategy (prospector firms) are more likely to have higher levels of accounting conservatism (CON). In Table 5 , the coefficients for G_SALES and G_PPE are consistently negative and statistically significant at 1% level across all estimates. Thus, firms experiencing growth in sales and investments in PPE are less likely to engage in earnings management. Prospector firms, as opposed to defender firms, are more likely to experience growth in these two areas.
[INSERT TABLE 4] Earnings Management
Further, firms with large, positive operating cash flows are less likely and loss-making firms are more likely to engage in earnings management. Overall, the results in Table 5 provide strong support for H 2 that defender-strategy firms are more likely to engage in earnings management via discretionary accruals than prospector firms. [INSERT FIGURE 1] Table 6 reports the results of estimating models (4) and (5) As shown in Table 6 , in the CON sample, the variable STRT is positive and significant at 1% level (two-tailed). This result is consistent with the previous results in Table 4 . That is, prospector firms, on average, exhibit more accounting conservatism than defender firms.
[INSERT TABLE 5]
Effect of GDP Growth Rates on the Relation between Strategy and Earnings quality
Interestingly, the negative coefficient of -0.002 (significant at 1% level) on STRT*GDP_Dummy suggests that during periods of high GDP growth, prospector firms become less-conservative in reporting. This is potentially to match with investor sentiments in a strongly-performing economy. On the other hand, in the DACCR sample, defender firms engage in less earnings-management during periods of high GDP growth. This is so because the sign on STRT*GDP_Dummy is positive whereas the sign on STRT is negative. Thus, during periods of high economic growth, earnings quality of prospector firms declines (less conservatism) while earnings quality of defender firms improve (less earnings-management).
We find consistent results (untabulated) when we set GDP_Dummy to 1 for low GDP-growth periods. That is, in low-GDP growth periods, prospector firms become more conservative in reporting whereas defender firms become aggressive in earnings management. In summary, we find that prospector and defender firms' reporting behavior are exactly opposite in both high and low economic growth periods.
[INSERT TABLE 6]
VI. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
We conduct additional tests to assess the sensitivity of our main results to alternative proxies for strategy (STRT), earnings management (DACCR), and accounting conservatism (CON).
Strategy (STRT) Classification
Our strategy (STRT) proxy is inspired by the work of Snow and Hambrick (1980) . Zahra & Pearce (1990) argue that a single proxy for firm strategy is insufficient due to the differences in strategy across industries which operate in different ways. This argument holds that, due to industry characteristics, the differences between prospectors and defenders over different industries and firms may be incorrectly classified when measured in a uniform manner.
In our analysis, we mitigated this concern by incorporating industry-effects to control for any variation in strategy due to industry characteristics. Further, to ensure that our results are not driven by the significant presence of the technology sector in our samples, we now exclude the technology sector while re-estimating models (2) and (3). These results are reported in Table 7 . We exclude the technology sector because of the high rate of innovation, market creation, and growth that would be expected in this industry.
[INSERT TABLE 7]
Results reported in Table 7 are consistent with our main results reported in Tables 4 and 5. In the CON sample, the coefficient on STRT is still positive but significant only at 10% level (two-tailed). In the DACCR sample, the coefficient of STRT is negative and significant at the 1% level (two-tailed). Further, in untabulated tests, we treat strategy as a binary variable with strategy scores not less than 10 set to 1 (i.e., prospector firms). All other strategy scores are set to zero (i.e., defender firms). We find results consistent with our main results.
Alternative Measures for Accounting Conservatism (CON) and Earnings Management (DACCR)
We use the Khan and Watt's (2009) asymmetric timeliness measure of conservatism as an alternative proxy for accounting conservatism and the Jones model (1991) as an alternative proxy for earnings management. Results presented in Table 8 , based on these alternative proxies, are consistent with our main results. In the CON sample, the coefficient of STRT is positive and significant at 1% level, which is consistent with the main results. In the DACCR sample, consistent with previous results, STRT is negative and significant at the 1% level.
In sum, the results are consistent with our predictions even after employing alternative proxies for accounting conservatism, earnings management, alternative coding of business strategy and exclusion of the technology sector from the analysis. Further, results are consistent across samples and across years.
[INSERT TABLE 8]
VII. CONCLUSION
We examine whether business strategy is associated with earnings quality. We also examine whether the relation between business strategy and earnings quality is affected by wider macro-economic environments. Although accounting policy choices are linked to investment decisions (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990) which follow from business strategy, evidence on the link between financial reporting quality and business strategy is sparse. We provide direct evidence of the important link between earnings quality and business strategy.
Within the Miles and Snow (1978) strategy typology, we classified U.S. listed firms into prospector and defender strategy-firms based on the 'objective-indicators' approach proposed by Snow and Hambrick (1980) . We employed four proxies for strategy classification: (1) the ratio of research and development expense to sales, (2) research and development expense per employee, (3) the ratio of employees to sales, and (4) the market to book ratio. Using these four proxies, we computed composite strategy scores for each firm.
Firms that scored 10 or more were classified as prospector firms and firms that scored below 10 were classified as defender firms. In particular, we analyzed a sample of 14,729 firm-years to test accounting conservatism and a sample of 23,390 firm-years to test earnings management. Our measure of accounting conservatism is based on Givoly and Hayn's (2000) measure of non-operating accruals. We also employed the Khan and Watts (2009) measure of conservatism as an alternative proxy for conservatism. Our measure of earnings management is the absolute value of discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) . We also employed the Jones model (Jones, 1991) as a further sensitivity test of our results. In our analysis, we incorporated several control variables including industry and year effects.
We predicted and found that prospector-strategy firms are associated with higher levels of accounting conservatism and defender-strategy firms are associated with higher levels of earnings management. However, this relation between business strategy and earnings quality is altered during high and low economic growth periods. In high-growth periods, while prospector firms exhibit lesser accounting conservatism, defender firms exhibit lesser earning management. In low-growth periods, the prospector firms become more conservative in financial reporting while the defender firms engage in more aggressive earnings management.
Our findings have important implications for investors and users of financial
reporting. That is, an assessment of earnings quality (or lack of it) is incomplete and potentially misleading without understanding business strategy of the firms in question.
Moreover, investors and other users of financial statements can develop insights into firms'
earnings quality by trying to identify their business strategy in the first place. Thus, our findings provide direct evidence of the link between business strategy and earnings quality. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
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Variable definitions: CON is based on the Givoly and Hayn's (2000) measure of conservatism. STRT is the business strategy of firm i in year t based on the approach developed by Snow and Hambrick (1980) . LN_ASSETS is natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t. F_LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets of firm i in year t. G_SALES is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in current year minus sales in prior year and divided by sales in prior year for firm i in year t. M_RISK is a measure of systematic risk which shows the relationship between the volatility of the stock and the volatility of the market. This coefficient is based on between 23 and 35 consecutive month end price percent changes and their relativity to a local market index. |DACCR| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of firm i in year t under the modified Jones model . G_PPE is the growth rate of gross property plant and equipment (PPE), defined as the gross PPE in current year minus the gross PPE in prior year and divided by the gross PPE in prior year for firm i in year t. CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by total assets. Loss takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t reports negative income before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions: CON is based on the Givoly and Hayn's (2000) accruals based measure of conservatism. STRT is the business strategy of firm i in year t measured by Snow and Hambrick (1980) . LN_ASSETS is natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t. F_LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets of firm i in year t. G_SALES is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in current year minus sales in prior year and divided by sales in prior year for firm i in year t. M_RISK is a measure of systematic risk which shows the relationship between the volatility of the stock and the volatility of the market. This coefficient is based on between 23 and 35 consecutive month end price percent changes and their relativity to a local market index. |DACCR| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of firm i in year t under Modified Jones model . G_PPE is the growth rate of gross PPE, defined as the gross PPE in current year minus the gross PPE in prior year and divided by the gross PPE in prior year for firm i in year t. CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by total assets. Loss takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t reports negative income before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise. . STRT is the business strategy of sample firm i in year t based on the approach developed by Snow and Hambrick (1980) . GDP_Dummy is a binary variable coded 1 for high U.S. GDP growth years (1999, 2000 and 2004) and 0 for low U.S. GDP growth years (2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009) . LN_ASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t. F_LEV is the end of year total liabilities divided by end of year total assets of firm i in year t. G_SALES is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in current year minus sales in prior year and divided by sales in prior year for firm i in year t. G_PPE is the growth rate of gross PPE, defined as the gross PPE in current year minus the gross PPE in prior year and divided by the gross PPE in prior year for firm i in year t. CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by total assets. LOSS takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t reports negative income before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise. *** , ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Givoly and Hayn's (2000) accruals based measure of conservatism. STRT is the business strategy of firm i in year t based on the approach developed by Snow and Hambrick (1980) . LN_ASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t. F_LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets of firm i in year t. G_SALES is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in current year minus sales in prior year and divided by sales in prior year for firm i in year t. M_RISK is a measure of systematic risk which shows the relationship between the volatility of the stock and the volatility of the market. This coefficient is based on between 23 and 35 consecutive month end price percent changes and their relativity to a local market index. |DACCR| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of firm i in year t under the Modified Jones model . G_PPE is the growth rate of gross PPE, defined as the gross PPE in current year minus the gross PPE in prior year and divided by the gross PPE in prior year for firm i in year t. CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by total assets. Loss takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t reports negative income before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise. *** , ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. CON is based on the Khan and Watts (2009) asymmetric timeliness measure of conservatism. STRT is the business strategy of firm i in year t based on the approach developed by Snow and Hambrick (1980) . LN_ASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t. F_LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets of firm i in year t. G_SALES is the sales growth rate, defined as the sales in current year minus sales in prior year and divided by sales in prior year for firm i in year t. M_RISK is a measure of systematic risk which shows the relationship between the volatility of the stock and the volatility of the market. This coefficient is based on between 23 and 35 consecutive month end price percent changes and their relativity to a local market index. |DACCR| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of firm i in year t under the Jones (1991) model. G_PPE is the growth rate of gross PPE, defined as the gross PPE in current year minus the gross PPE in prior year and divided by the gross PPE in prior year for firm i in year t. CFO is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by total assets. Loss takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t reports negative income before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise. *** , ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
